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Abstract
Motivated by the need to bolster the resilience of infrastructure, such as bridges,
nuclear power plants, and ports, in face of extreme weather events, we consider two
types of projects: “riskier” and “safer.” Each type of project, once constructed, earns
identical instantaneous cash flows and is subject to the same risk of outage, which
causes its cash flows to diminish. The only difference between the two projects is that
the repair rate of the “safer” project is greater than that of the “riskier” one. Naturally,
the “safer” project is more valuable to an investor due to its greater resilience. However,
how much extra would an investor be willing to pay for this resilience? Under which
circumstances would it be reasonable to replace the outage and repair rates with
average outage factors? Using a real options approach, we show that even though the
proportions of up- and down-times remain fixed, changes in the transition rates affect
the willingness to pay for resilience. This implies that use of average outage factors will
incorrectly inflate the resilience premium. In fact, only in the limit when transitions
occur at infinitely high rates does the use of average outage factors accurately reflect
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the investor’s willingness to pay for resilience. Somewhat paradoxically, very frequent
transitions reflect a situation in which average outage factors may be used.
Index terms—OR in environment and climate change, real options, investment analysis
1 Introduction
The occurrence of extreme weather events, such as floods and hurricanes, driven by climate
change has become frequent. This poses risks for many infrastructure projects, such as
bridges, nuclear power plants, and ports, which are necessarily located in areas prone to
flooding or landslides. In fact, a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency white paper (EPA ,
2008) stressed the need for adaptation measures that would bolster the resilience of ports
specifically. Some of the impacts of climate change that it outlines are increased water
levels and more severe storms. In response to these threats, adaptation measures posited
by the white paper are protective seawalls and reinforcement of existing structures against
stronger winds. Aware of its vulnerability to climate change, the County of Miami-Dade
has invested in such measures as part of its Local Mitigation Strategy (Miami-Dade , 2016).
Out of the $170 million earmarked for projects in 2015, over $10 million went towards the
construction of a new seawall for the Miami Seaport along with the installation of concrete
panels for greater resilience.
Naturally, we would conclude that a safer project, i.e., one that is able to resume
operations more quickly after a contingency such as the newly retrofitted Miami Seaport,
would be more valuable to an investor due to its greater resilience.1 However, how much
extra would such an investor be willing to pay for this resilience? In much of the analysis
of the impacts of climate change and the benefits of adaptation or mitigation measures,
this question is addressed by determining expected welfare based on probability estimates
1Resilience is defined by the Resilience Alliance (Walker et al., 2004) as “...the capacity of a system to
absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function,
structure, identity, and feedbacks.”
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of catastrophes, i.e., regime switches in an ecosystem (Walker et al., 2010). More recent
work takes an experimental economics approach to ascertain consumers’ willingness to
pay for more resilience (Richter and Weeks, 2016).
Yet, in these approaches, adaptation measures simply reduce the impact of damage
from environmental factors. Via a now-or-never net present value (NPV) analysis that
uses average outage factors, we first show that the willingness to pay for more resilient
infrastructure depends only on the ratio of the outage and repair rates. Since adoption
of such infrastructure is likely to be carried out by commercial decision makers (even if
they use public funds) who will be concerned about the timing of the investment, under
which circumstances would it be reasonable to replace the outage and repair rates with
average outage factors in an economic analysis of resilience? Using a real options approach
as suggested in Whitten et al. (2012), we demonstrate that even though the proportion of
up- and down-times remains fixed, changes in the transition rates affect the willingness
to pay for resilience. This implies that use of average outage factors will incorrectly
overestimate the resilience premium. Intuitively, using average outage factors means
complete elimination of the risk, whereas a resilience measure can only mitigate the risk.
In fact, only in the limit when transitions occur at infinitely high rates will the use of
average outage factors accurately reflect the investor’s willingness to pay for resilience.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related work in order
to provide context for our analysis. We develop the main mathematical model and derive
analytical results in Section 3 for each type of project. Section 4 uses numerical examples
to illustrate the insights, while Section 5 summarises the work and offers directions for
future research. All proofs of the propositions may be found in the appendix.
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2 Related Work
In contrast to the now-or-never NPV approach, the real options framework enables a
decision maker to account for flexibility over investment timing and operations when
undertaking the initial adoption (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The canonical setup assumes
that the revenue from the completed project is exogenous, e.g., a geometric Brownian
motion (GBM), and that cash flows from operations continue indefinitely after investment.
Variations to the latter assumption posit that physical risk may cause the installed project
to depreciate with subsequent re-investment options available to the decision maker. Ch.
6 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) demonstrates that closed-form analytical solutions are
possible in this context when physical outages occur according to a Poisson process. In
the context of technology adoption under uncertainty, Farzin et al. (1998) and Doraszelski
(2001) determine the optimal strategy of a firm that may upgrade to a new version given
that technological performance advances randomly. Grenadier and Weiss (1997) exam-
ine alternative adoption strategies under both economic and technological uncertainty
with finite upgrade opportunities, whereas Malchow-Møller and Thorsen (2005) extend
the framework to consider infinite upgrade opportunities. Motivated by the problem
of replacing wind turbines, Chronopoulos and Siddiqui (2015) extend the analysis of
Grenadier and Weiss (1997) to derive further insights about the impact of the economic
and technological uncertainties on the value of alternative adoption strategies. Likewise in
the context of renewable energy investment, Boomsma et al. (2012) and Adkins and Paxson
(2016) examine the impact of policy risk on technology choice.
A more general treatment of alternative investment strategies under uncertainty is
taken up by De´camps et al. (2006). Considering two mutually exclusive projects with
values depending on a common underlying price following a GBM, they show that, in
contrast to an earlier analysis by Dixit (1993), the waiting region may be dichotomous. In
particular, for an intermediate price range and with a relatively low level of volatility in
the underlying price, it may be desirable to wait for more information before investing in
4
the larger (smaller) project if the price increases (decreases) sufficiently. The analysis of
alternative investment strategies (direct and stepwise) is conducted by Kort et al. (2010) for
the same project. Somewhat surprisingly, although the stepwise strategy is more valuable,
its relative advantage over the direct strategy diminishes as uncertainty increases. In effect,
relatively high volatility in the underlying payoff tends to delay investment of any kind,
thereby narrowing the benefit of using a stepwise strategy. Siddiqui and Takashima (2012)
extend such an analysis to a duopolistic setting.
Our contribution to the literature is similar in spirit to that of Kort et al. (2010): we aim
to determine the premium that an investor would be willing to pay in order to select one
type of project over another. The main difference is that while two investment strategies
were their focus, our aim is to determine an investor’s the willingness to pay for resilience.
Thus, in addition to modelling economic uncertainty via a GBM, we include the physical
risk to an infrastructure project via a Poisson process. Consequently, we are able to cast the
value of resilience in terms of an investment premium and illustrate why it is important to
model physical risk explicitly in project valuation as opposed to via average outage factors.
3 Mathematical Model and Analytical Results
3.1 Assumptions
Consider two types of infrastructure projects, i ∈ {R,S}, where R stands for “riskier” and S
for “safer.” Each type of project, once constructed, earns identical instantaneous cash flows
of pii (Pt) = Pt − k in state 1 (Fig. 1) at time t ≥ 0, where dPt = αPtdt + σPtdzt is the GBM
describing the exogenous revenues earned from operations, k > 0 is the operating cost, I i
is the investment cost for project type i, α ≥ 0 is the annual drift rate, σ ≥ 0 is the annual
volatility, and ξ i is the optimal investment threshold for project i. All cash flows and rates
are in real terms.
Each project is subject to the same physical outage at rate λ1, which causes its cash
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State 0
Investment
cost: I i
Optimal
investment
threshold: ξ i
State 1
Outage
rate: λ1
State 2
Repair
rate: λi2
Figure 1: State-transition diagram for a project with physical risk
flows to diminish to pii (Pt) = −s in state 2, where s > k represents the costs associated with
repairs. The only difference between the two projects is that the repair rate of project S,
λS2 > 0, is greater than that of project R, λ
R
2 > 0. In the analysis, we assume no switching
options after a project of a certain type has been constructed. This is because infrastructure
projects such as bridges, nuclear power plants, and ports cannot be easily modified once
constructed, especially for purely economic reasons.
3.2 Project Valuation with Average Outage Factors
Instead of modelling the risk of physical failures in a real options valuation of each project,
suppose that a firm were to use average outage factors. Specifically, this means that for each
project i, the proportions representing time spent in states 1 and 2, i.e., λ
i
2
λ1+λ
i
2
and λ1
λ1+λ
i
2
,
would be used to determine average cash flows (Fig. 2). Thus, the average instantaneous
cash flow for project i after investment is p¯ii (Pt) =
(
λi2
λ1+λ
i
2
)
(Pt − k)−
(
λ1
λ1+λ
i
2
)
s. Consequently,
the expected discounted value of project i at some arbitrary price, P > 0, using a subjective
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discount rate, ρ > α, with average outage factors is:
V¯ i1 (P ) = EP
[∫ ∞
0
p¯ii (Pt)e
−ρtdt
]
⇒ V¯ i1 (P ) =
(
λi2
λ1 +λ
i
2
)
P
(ρ −α) −
(
λi2k +λ1s
)(
λ1 +λ
i
2
)
ρ
(1)
Via dynamic programming (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), the value of the option to invest in
project i from state 0 may be found as:
V¯ i0 (P ) = a¯
i
0P
β1 , (2)
where β1 > 1 is the root of the following characteristic quadratic:
1
2
σ2β (β − 1) +αβ − ρ = 0 (3)
The optimal investment threshold for project i is:
ξ¯ i =
(
β1
β1 − 1
)
(ρ −α)
λi2
I i (λ1 +λi2)+
(
λi2k +λ1s
)
ρ
 (4)
The endogenous constant in Eq. (2) is:
a¯i0 =
1
β1
(
λi2
λ1 +λ
i
2
) (ξ¯ i)1−β1
(ρ −α) (5)
The latter two are obtained via standard value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
between V¯ i0 (P ) and V¯
i
1 (P )− I i at P = ξ¯ i .
Suppose now that we would like to determine how much extra an investor would be
willing to pay for project type S rather than R. Keeping constant the investment cost
of project type R and the expected discounted operating costs of the two projects, i.e.,
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Cash flow
t
· · ·
−s
Pt − k
· · ·
Figure 2: Cash flows during a typical cycle
(λi2k+λ1s)
(λ1+λi2)ρ
, we have the degree of freedom only to increase IS until it hits a critical threshold,
I¯ , such that the investor is indifferent between the two types of projects. In other words,
we force a¯R0 to equal a¯
S
0 and determine the resilience premium, κ¯:
Proposition 1. κ¯ ≡
[
I¯+
(λS2 k+λ1s)
(λ1+λS2)ρ
]
[
IR+
(λR2 k+λ1s)
(λ1+λR2 )ρ
] =

λS2
(λ1+λS2)
λR2
(λ1+λR2 )

β1
β1−1
In a now-or-never NPV analysis, the corresponding resilience premium, κ¯NPV , has a
similar form but does not depend on uncertainty:
Corollary 1. κ¯NPV ≡
[
I¯+
(λS2 k+λ1s)
(λ1+λS2)ρ
]
[
IR+
(λR2 k+λ1s)
(λ1+λR2 )ρ
] =
λS2
(λ1+λS2)
λR2
(λ1+λR2 )
It is also straightforward to prove that the average resilience premium is, indeed, greater
than one (Cor. 2) and that it is increasing as either the volatility of cash flows or project
S’s repair rate increases (Props. 2 and 3, respectively), ceteris paribus. Intuitively, a higher
cash-flow volatility or repair rate of project S also implies a higher expected present value
of revenues, which results in a greater resilience premium.
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Corollary 2. κ¯ > 1
Proposition 2. ∂κ¯∂σ > 0
Proposition 3. ∂κ¯
∂λS2
> 0
3.3 Project Valuation with Explicit Treatment of Physical Risk
If we treat the risks of outages and repairs explicitly, then we obtain the following expres-
sions for each project i in state j, where j = 1,2 (Makimoto, 2006):
V ij (P ) = a
i
jP + b
i
j (6)
where
ai1 =
(ρ+λi2 −α)
(ρ+λ1 −α)(ρ+λi2 −α)−λ1λi2
> 0, ai2 =
λi2
(ρ+λ1 −α)(ρ+λi2 −α)−λ1λi2
> 0
bi1 = −
(λ1s+ (ρ+λ
i
2)k)
(ρ+λ1)(ρ+λ
i
2)−λ1λi2
< 0, bi2 = −
(λi2k + (ρ+λ1)s)
(ρ+λ1)(ρ+λ
i
2)−λ1λi2
< 0
Again, through standard dynamic programming methods, the value of the option to invest
from state 0 in plant i is:
V i0 (P ) = a
i
0P
β1 , (7)
where
ξ i =
(
β1
β1 − 1
)(
I i − bi1
ai1
)
(8)
and
ai0 =
ai1
β1
(
β1
β1 − 1
)1−β1 (I i − bi1
ai1
)1−β1
(9)
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are obtained via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between V i0(P ) and V
i
1(P )−
I i at P = ξ i as defined in Eqs. (7) and (6), respectively.
As in Section 3.2, it is possible to define a resilience premium, κ, which here does not
depend on average outage factors. Instead, it uses the actual repair rates and is obtained
by equating the ai0 terms from Eq. (9). Since I
i − bi1 may be thought of as the discounted
investment and operating costs of project i and Iˆ is the maximum willingness to pay for
project S, analogous to Prop. 1, we can express the resilience premium as a ratio.
Proposition 4. κ ≡ Iˆ−bS1
IR−bR1
=
(
aS1
aR1
) β1
β1−1
Furthermore, we can prove that the resilience premium here is greater than one, in-
creasing with volatility, and increasing with the repair rate of project S.
Corollary 3. κ > 1
Proposition 5. ∂κ∂σ > 0
Proposition 6. ∂κ
∂λS2
> 0
Now, suppose that we change all transition rates by some factor η > 0, which clearly
does not affect the proportion of time spent in state 1 or 2. Such a transformation would
not affect any of the results in the previous section concerning ξ¯ i or Props. 1–3. Yet, if
physical risks were explicitly treated, then they would affect not only optimal investment
thresholds but also the resilience premium, which is κ (η) and dependent on the maximum
amount that the investor is willing to pay, Iˆ , for project S. In the limit, as cycles become
more frequent, i.e., η→∞, we can show that the resilience premium converges to κ¯:
Proposition 7. limη→∞κ (η) = κ¯
Intuitively, it is only in a situation with very frequent state transitions that it is ac-
ceptable to determine the resilience premium on the basis of average outage factors. By
contrast, when state transitions hardly occur, i.e., η→ 0, there is no willingness to pay for
resilience:
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Proposition 8. limη→0κ (η) = 1
In general, the resilience premium is an increasing function of the transition rate:
Proposition 9. ∂κ(η)∂η > 0
The next two propositions and Lemma 1 summarise the economic implications of
simplifying the real options analysis. First, Prop. 10 indicates that the use of average
outage factors postpones investment vis-a`-vis the explicit treatment of risk because the
latter recognises that risk has not been eliminated and invests only in an active project that
commences operations in state 1. Thus, real options analysis with explicit treatment of risk
will not require as high of a threshold as one with average outage factors. Second, Prop. 11
states that the value of the investment opportunity when risk is treated explicitly is higher
than when average outage factors are used. The intuition for this result is similar to that
for Prop. 10: explicitly accounting for physical risk means that no project would ever start
in state 2, i.e., the payoff of the option is inherently more valuable. Therefore, an investor
who uses average outage factors in a real options analysis will (incorrectly) be willing to
pay more for resilience as shown in Lemma 1.
Proposition 10. ξ i (η) < ξ¯ i
Proposition 11. ai0 > a¯
i
0
Lemma 1. κ¯ > κ(η)
Finally, Prop. 12 reveals that the discrepancy between the resilience premia increases
as uncertainty increases. Indeed, the impact of using average outage factors is magnified
in a more economically volatile situation.
Proposition 12. ∂κ¯/κ(η)∂σ > 0
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4 Numerical Examples
We use the following parameter values to illustrate the properties of the solutions and
value functions: α = 0,ρ = 0.05,λ1 = 0.5,λ
R
2 = 0.2, I
R = 10,λS2 = 0.3, I
S = 15, k = 1, s = 2,σ =
0.2, P0 = 1. First, we plot the value functions for the two plant types with average outage
factors (Fig. 3). As expected, for an arbitrarily low initial price, the option to invest in the
“safer” project is more valuable and triggers earlier investment. Next, we do the same when
physical risks are correctly modelled (Fig. 4). Here, there are two sets of post-investment
value functions for each type of project depending on the state of operations. Thus, the
physical risk is reflected in the value of the investment opportunity even as the “safer”
project is worth more than the “riskier” one.
0 5 10 15
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
80
P
V¯
i 1
(P
)
−
I
i
,
V¯
i 0
(P
)
V¯ R1 (P)− I
R
V¯ R0 (P)
V¯
S
1 (P)− I
S
V¯
S
0 (P)
Figure 3: Value functions with average availability factors for σ = 0.20
The optimal investment thresholds and corresponding option value coefficients for
various volatilities, i.e., σ ∈ [0.20,0.40], are plotted in Figs. 5 and 6 to verify Props. 10 and
11, respectively. In particular, the value of the option to invest is higher when modelling
physical risk for each type of project with a lower corresponding investment threshold.
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Figure 4: Value functions with physical risk for σ = 0.20
As argued in Section 3.3, this discrepancy follows from the higher intrinsic value of the
post-investment project in state 1 as opposed to some value based on an average outage
factor.
The next plot in Fig. 7 illustrates Props. 1, 4, 7, 8, and 9, Cors. 2 and 3, and Lemma 1,
where the horizontal line indicates the resilience premium under the assumption of average
outage factors, κ¯ = 1.66. Here, IR is fixed at 10, but IS is varied until the option values of
the two projects are equal. Thus, while κ¯ is unaffected by η, κ(η), which is the resilience
premium in a model with explicit treatment of physical risk, increases monotonically until
it asymptotically approaches κ¯. Finally, Fig. 8 indicates that both resilience risk premia
increase with volatility along with their ratio as proven in Props. 2, 5, and 12. Hence, when
using average factors, the investor typically overvalues the resilience premium except
when cycles become exceptionally short.
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Figure 5: Effect of volatility on the optimal investment thresholds
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Figure 7: Effect of cycle length on the resilience premium, κ (η)
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Figure 8: Effect of volatility on the resilience premium, κ
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5 Conclusions
Given the increased occurrence of extreme weather events linked to climate change, owners
of infrastructure are considering investment in more resilient plants. Although policymak-
ers typically offer incentives to improve investment in and retrofit of infrastructure that is
better adapted to climate risk, ultimately, the adoption decision is undertaken by private
investors who aim to maximise the value of their projects. Thus, it is desirable to consider
the willingness of decision makers to pay for enhanced resilience in a market environment
with both economic uncertainty and physical risk.
Drawing upon the real options approach for assessing the premium associated with a
more flexible investment strategy (Kort et al., 2010), we determine the willingness to pay for
resilience in the context of infrastructure projects. Specifically, we include physical risk to
the operations of infrastructure projects as a Poisson process and determine the maximum
additional capital expenditure that an investor would be willing to outlay in exchange
for a more resilient project, i.e., one that resumes operations from an inactive state more
quickly. We show analytically that the resilience premium obtained via explicit treatment
of physical risk is always less than that implied by a simpler real options analysis that uses
average outage factors. Intuitively, the latter analysis with average outage factors assumes
that greater resilience essentially means eliminating all of the risk. However, the analysis
with explicit treatment of risk acknowledges that risk can only be mitigated. Consequently,
its resilience premium is less than that yielded by the analysis with average outage factors.
Yet, sensitivity analysis with respect to cycle lengths indicates that this discrepancy between
the two premia dissipates as frequency of transitions increases. Indeed, in the limit as
cycle lengths become very short, the use of average outage factors becomes acceptable as
an approximation. Hence, our work demonstrates that policy initiatives based on average
outage factors to bolster investment in more resilient infrastructure may overestimate
industry’s willingness to pay.
Our analysis is necessarily stylised in order to obtain analytical results. It is, therefore,
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limited by its choice of stochastic processes capturing both economic uncertainty and
physical risk. Numerical approaches using more realistic stochastic processes applied
to case studies would, thus, be welcome extensions. Likewise, analyses with mutually
exclusive investment between “safer” and “riskier” options (De´camps et al., 2006) or under
rivalry (Siddiqui and Takashima, 2012) would provide richer insights.
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: Use the definitions of a¯i0 and equate them:
(
λR2
λ1 +λ
R
2
)β1 IR +
(
λR2k +λ1s
)(
λ1 +λ
R
2
)
ρ

1−β1
=
(
λS2
λ1 +λ
S
2
)β1 IS +
(
λS2k +λ1s
)(
λ1 +λ
S
2
)
ρ

1−β1
⇒ κ¯ =

λS2
(λ1+λS2)
λR2
(λ1+λR2 )

β1
β1−1
(10)
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Proof of Corollary 1: Use the definitions of V¯ i1(P ), equate them at P = ξ
R
NPV ≡ (ρ−α)λi2[
I i
(
λ1 +λ
i
2
)
+ (
λi2k+λ1s)
ρ
]
and solve for κ¯NPV ≡
[
I¯+
(λS2 k+λ1s)
(λ1+λS2)ρ
]
[
IR+
(λR2 k+λ1s)
(λ1+λR2 )ρ
] :
λS2
λ1 +λ
S
2
IR +
(
λR2k +λ1s
)(
λ1 +λ
R
2
)
ρ
 = λR2λ1 +λR2
IS +
(
λS2k +λ1s
)(
λ1 +λ
S
2
)
ρ

⇒ κ¯NPV =
λS2
(λ1+λS2)
λR2
(λ1+λR2 )
(11)
Proof of Corollary 2: Since κ¯ > 1⇔
λS2
(λ1+λS2)
λR2
(λ1+λR2 )
> 1, we need the following:
λS2(
λ1 +λ
S
2
) > λR2(
λ1 +λ
R
2
)
⇒ λS2λ1 +λS2λR2 > λS2λR2 +λR2λ1
⇒ λS2 > λR2 ,
which is true by assumption.
Proof of Proposition 2: From Eq. (10), we have:
∂κ¯
∂σ
= − log

λS2
λ1+λ
S
2
λR2
λ1+λ
R
2


λS2
λ1+λ
S
2
λR2
λ1+λ
R
2

β1
β1−1
1
(β1 − 1)2
∂β1
∂σ
.
Since
λS2
λ1+λ
S
2
λR2
λ1+λ
R
2
= λ1λ
S
2+λ
S
2λ
R
2
λ1λ
R
2 +λ
S
2λ
R
2
> 1, log

λS2
λ1+λ
S
2
λR2
λ1+λ
R
2
 > 0. In addition, from

λS2
λ1+λ
S
2
λR2
λ1+λ
R
2

β1
β1−1
> 0, − 1(β1−1)2 < 0,
and ∂β1∂σ < 0 (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), we can obtain
∂κ¯
∂σ > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3: We partially differentiate Eq. (10) with respect to λS2 :
∂κ¯
∂λS2
=
(
β1
β1 − 1
)
λS2
(λ1+λS2)
λR2
(λ1+λR2 )

1
β1−1 (
λ1 +λ
R
2
λR2
)
λ1(
λ1 +λ
S
2
)2 (12)
Since each term on the right-hand side of Eq. (12) is positive, we have the result.
Proof of Proposition 4: Use the definitions of ai0 and equate them:
aR1
β1
(
β1
β1 − 1
)1−β1 (IR − bR1
aR1
)1−β1
=
aS1
β1
(
β1
β1 − 1
)1−β1 ( Iˆ − bS1
aS1
)1−β1
⇒ κ ≡ Iˆ − b
S
1
IR − bR1
=
(
aS1
aR1
) β1
β1−1
(13)
Proof of Corollary 3: Since κ > 1⇔ aS1 > aR1 , we need to demonstrate the following:
∂
∂x
(
ρ+ x −α
(ρ+λ1 −α) (ρ+ x −α)−λ1x
)
> 0
⇒ (ρ+λ1 −α) (ρ+ x −α)−λ1x − (ρ+ x −α) (ρ −α)
((ρ+λ1 −α) (ρ+ x −α)−λ1x)2
> 0
⇒ λ1 (ρ −α)
((ρ+λ1 −α) (ρ+ x −α)−λ1x)2
> 0,
which holds because both the numerator and the denominator are positive.
Proof of Proposition 5: From Eq. (13), we have:
∂κ
∂σ
= − log
(
aS1
aR1
)(
aS1(η)
aR1 (η)
) β1
β1−1 1
(β1 − 1)2
∂β1
∂σ
. (14)
In Eq. (14), since we have aS1 > a
R
1 from Eq. (14), we obtain log
(
aS1
aR1
)
> 0. Thus, ∂κ∂σ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6: Partially differentiating κ in Eq. (13) with respect to λS2 , we
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have:
∂κ
∂λS2
=
(
β1
β1 − 1
)(
aS1
aR1
) 1
β1−1 1
aR1
∂aS1
∂λS2
,
which is greater than zero because each term is greater than zero and ∂a
S
1
∂λS2
> 0 follows from
the proof of Corollary 3.
Proof of Proposition 7: First, use l’Hoˆpital’s rule to show that limη→∞ ai1 (η) =
λi2
(ρ−α)(λi2+λ1)
.
Next, take the limit of the expression in Prop. 4:
lim
η→∞κ (η) = limη→∞
(
aS1 (η)
aR1 (η)
) β1
β1−1
⇒ lim
η→∞κ (η) =

λS2
(λ1+λS2)
λR2
(λ1+λR2 )

β1
β1−1
(15)
Proof of Proposition 8: First, use l’Hoˆpital’s rule to show that limη→0 ai1 (η) =
1
(ρ−α) .
Next, take the limit of the expression in Prop. 4:
lim
η→0κ (η) = limη→0
(
aS1 (η)
aR1 (η)
) β1
β1−1
⇒ lim
η→0κ (η) =
{1
1
} β1
β1−1
(16)
Proof of Proposition 9: Using the definition of ai1 from Eq. (6), we have:
∂ai1(η)
∂η
= − λ1(ρ −α)
2[
(ρ+ ηλ1 −α)(ρ+ ηλi2 −α)− η2λ1λi2
]2 < 0 (17)
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∂aR1 (η)
∂η
>
∂aS1(η)
∂η
⇒
∂aS1 (η)
∂η
∂aR1 (η)
∂η
< 1 (18)
∂κ(η)
∂η
=
(
β1
β1 − 1
)(
aS1(η)
aR1 (η)
) 1
β1−1

∂aS1 (η)
∂η a
R
1 (η)− aS1(η)∂a
R
1 (η)
∂η
(aR1 (η))
2

= −
(
β1
β1 − 1
)(
aS1(η)
aR1 (η)
) 1
β1−1 [ 1
(aR1 (η))
2
](
∂aR1 (η)
∂η
)aS1(η)− aR1 (η)
∂aS1 (η)
∂η
∂aR1 (η)
∂η
 (19)
From Eqs. (17) and (18), −
(
∂aR1 (η)
∂η
)aS1(η)− aR1 (η) ∂a
S
1 (η)
∂η
∂aR1 (η)
∂η
 in Eq. (19) is positive. Thus, ∂κ(η)∂η >
0.
Proof of Lemma 1: From κ¯ > 1, limη→0κ(η) = 1 in Prop. 8, limη→∞κ(η) = κ¯ in Prop. 7,
and ∂κ(η)∂η > 0 in Prop. 9, we can obtain κ¯ > κ(η) for ∀η.
Proof of Proposition 10: Using the definition of bi1 from Eq. (6), we have:
∂bi1(η)
∂η
=
ρ2λ1(k − s)[
(ρ+ ηλ1)(ρ+ ηλ
i
2)− η2λ1λi2
]2 < 0 (20)
lim
η→∞ξ
i(η) = ξ¯ i (21)
lim
η→0ξ
i(η) =
β1
β1 − 1(ρ −α)
(
I i +
k
ρ
)
< ξ¯ i (22)
From Eqs. (17) and (3),
∂ξ i(η)
∂η
= −
(
β1
β1 − 1
) (∂bi1(η)
∂η a
i
1(I
i − bi1(η))∂a
i
1(η)
∂η
)
(ai1(η))
2
> 0 (23)
Thus, from Eqs. (21)–(23), ξ i (η) < ξ¯ i for ∀η.
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Proof of Proposition 11: From Prop. 10, we know that:
ξ i(η)
1−β1 > ξ¯ i1−β1 (24)
ai1(η)−
ηλi2
(ηλ1 + ηλ
i
2)(ρ −α)
=
(ρ −α)2ηλ1
(ρ −α)(ηλ1 + ηλi2)
{
(ρ −α)(ηλ1 + ηλi2) + (ρ −α)2
} > 0 (25)
From Eqs. (24) and (25),
ai0(η)− a¯i0 =
1
β1
(
ai1(η)ξ
i(η)
1−β1 − ηλ
i
2
(ηλ1 + ηλ
i
2)(ρ −α)
ξ¯ i
1−β1
)
> 0 (26)
Proof of Proposition 12: Using Eqs. (10) and (13), we obtain:
κ¯
κ(η)
=

λS2
λ1+λ
S
2
λR2
λ1+λ
R
2
aS1 (η)
aR1 (η)

β1
β1−1
. (27)
When Λ =
λS2
λ1+λ
S
2
λR2
λ1+λ
R
2
/
aS1 (η)
aR1 (η)
, ∂κ¯/κ(η)∂σ =
∂
∂σΛ
β1
β1−1 = − logΛΛ
β1
β1−1
{
1
(β1−1)2
}
∂β1
∂σ . From Lemma 1, we
can obtain logΛ > 0. Thus, ∂κ¯/κ(η)∂σ > 0.
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